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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. RESPONSE STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
This lawsuit and appeal arise out of the termination of an Auto-qualification Agreement 
("Agreement") between Macris & Associates ("Macris") and Images & Attitudes ("Images"). R. 
8-10, 228-29, 431 -32, 507 p. 12. Macris filed his first complaint, Macris v. Images ("first 
lawsuit"), against Images for the 1991 breach of the agreement on or about April 17, 1991. R. 8, 
208-214, 413. Macris filed his second complaint, Macris v. Neways ("second lawsuit"), against 
Neways on or about February 14, 1995. R. 1-12. 
A. Images Sold and Transferred Some of its Assets to Neways, and Eclat 
Became Images9 Successor Corporation. 
On or about September 1, 1992, Images sold and transferred most of its assets to Neways, 
Inc. ("Neways") in order to insure a valuable multi-level marketing company without trademark 
problems. R. 227, 323, 351. Neways purchased many of Images' assets and paid valuable 
consideration for those assets. R. 227, 323, 351. However, Neways did not purchase Images' 
potential liability to Macris. R. 351. Instead, this liability was transferred to Images' successor 
corporation, Eclat, Inc. ("Eclat"). R. 11, 174. 
Although Neways purchased many of Images' assets, there are significant differences 
between Images' and Neways' corporate structures. For instance, contrary to Macris' contention, 
the record clearly shows that Images and Neways share only one director, the rest of the directors, 
shareholders, and officers are different. R. 92, 171, 352. Images and Neways do not share the 
"same facilities, employees, distributorships, and health and beauty care products." R. 92, 171. 
1 
Further, many of Images' distributors did not retain their same rank and downline in Neways. R. 
92, 171. 
B. After Images9 Transfer of Assets to Neways, Both Macris and Images Filed 
Pleadings in the First Lawsuit that Eventually Went to Trial. 
Both Macris and Images filed pleadings, as defined in Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, after Images' sale and transfer of assets to Neways. R. 507, p. 15. Images filed an 
Amended Answer on September 9, 1992. R. 507 p. 15; see Addendum. Almost a year after the 
transfer of assets, Macris filed the last pleading, Answer to Amended Counterclaim and Answer 
to Third-Party Complaint, on August 23, 1993. R. 507 p. 15; see Addendum. 
The trial setting in the first lawsuit was vacated on September 28, 1992, and was 
eventually tried two and a half years later on February 16, 1995. R. 227. During this period, the 
Court reopened discovery, Macris' counsel spent three days at Neways' legal counsel's office 
reviewing Neways' financial documentation, and Macris filed his last pleading, Answer to 
Amended Counterclaim and Answer to Third-Party Complaint, on August 23, 1993. R. 273-79, 
507 pp. 12, 14, 15. Even though both parties filed pleadings after the transfer, Macris failed to 
include causes of action for fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and/or successor liability in the first 
lawsuit. 
In the first lawsuit, the trial court held that Images breached its agreement with Macris. 
R. 279. Although Macris argued for future damages, the Court awarded Macris damages from the 
wrongful termination of the agreement in March of 1991 to August 31, 1992. R. 263, 507 p. 14. 
The amount of the judgment was $487,638.87 plus interest. R. 263, 507 p. 14. Macris had a full 
and fair opportunity to argue his future damages in the first lawsuit. R. 227-28, 507 p. 8-9. 
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C. After Being Denied Future Damages Past August 31,1992 in the First 
Lawsuit, Maoris Tried to Have a Second Bite at the Apple by Commencing 
the Second Lawsuit. 
Two days before the first lawsuit's trial, Macris filed the second suit, Macris & 
Associates v. Neways ("second lawsuit"), against Images' privy, Neways.1 R. 1-12. Because the 
trial court denied Macris' future damages past August 31, 1992 in the first lawsuit, Macris 
devised new legal theories (fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor liability) in a second 
effort to receive future damages resulting from the 1991 breach of the agreement. R. 227-28, 
507 p. 8-9. Because Macris did not plead these causes of action in the first lawsuit, litigation 
between the parties is now in its seventh year. R. 227-28, 507 p. 8-9. 
After Macris wasted Neways' and the judicial system's time and resources, Neways filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 217-29. Neways claimed that res judicata barred the 
second lawsuit because Images and Neways are in privity, the second lawsuit's claims could and 
should have been brought in the first lawsuit, and there was a judgment in the first lawsuit. R. 
217-29, 294-305.2 Further, Neways argued that Macris had already received $487,638.87 plus 
'In the Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court, Neways admitted, only for the 
purpose of the motion, that Neways was Images' privy. R. 224-25, 323-24. Therefore, 
throughout this appeal, when Neways argues that it is Images' privy, it is only for purposes of 
this appeal. 
2Contrary to Macris' assertions, Neways has consistently argued that res judicata bars the 
second lawsuit. At the commencement of the second lawsuit, Neways submitted a Motion to 
Dismiss arguing that the causes of action in the second lawsuit were not ripe. R. 34, 51-52. 
However, after comparing the facts to Utah law, it was clear that res judicata did in fact bar the 
second lawsuit. Therefore, Neways voluntarily withdrew its Motion to Dismiss so there was no 
adjudication on the matter. R. 61. Consequently, the assertions made in Neways' Motion to 
Dismiss are irrelevant. 
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interest from the 1991 breach of the agreement and the second lawsuit was an effort to use new 
legal theories to collect damages resulting from the breach. R. 1-12, 263. 
Macris filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Neways was Images' 
successor and, therefore, liable for Macris' judgment against Images. R. 286-93. To support his 
conclusion, Macris did not cite to any evidence in the record except Macris' allegations in the 
Complaint. R. 1-12, 286-93. Each of these allegations was denied by Neways in its Amended 
Answer. R. 166-75. Macris erroneously cited Neways'admission that Neways was in privity 
with Images as an admission that Neways was Images' successor. R. 286-93, 358-66. 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On September 19, 1997, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Howard Maetani 
presiding, issued its Memorandum Decision. R. 433. The trial court correctly held that res 
. judicata barred Macris from claiming future damages against Neways for the 1991 termination of 
the agreement because Neways and Images are privies, the claims could and should have been 
argued in the first lawsuit, and there was a final judgment in the first proceedings. R. 422-28. 
The trial court realized that Macris' guise of new legal theories against Images' privy was 
nothing more than a second attempt to receive future damages resulting from the 1991 breach of 
the agreement. R. 422-25. 
However, the trial court erred in two respects. First, the trial court did not extend the res 
judicata analysis to the successor liability claim. R. 422-28. Second, the trial court erroneously 
held that Neways was a mere continuation of Images and should be liable for Macris' judgment 
against Images. R. 425-28. The trial court did not receive any evidence on the successor liability 
issue, but based its ruling on disputed pleadings. R. 1-12, 166-75, 425-28, 431. Neways 
4 
disputed this alleged continuation in the trial court. For example, Images and Neways only shared 
one director, the rest of the directors, shareholders, and officers are different; Images and Neways 
did not use the "same facilities, employees, distributorships, and health and beauty care 
products;" and many of Images' distributors would not join Neways, causing many of Images' 
distributors not to retain their same rank and downline in Neways. R. 92, 171, 352. Further, the 
pleadings show that Macris alleged and Neways agreed that Eclat was the successor to Images. 
R. 11, 174. Therefore, material facts exist as to whether Neways is Images' successor 
corporation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RES JUDICATA BARS MACRIS' FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, ALTER EGO AND 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST NEWAYS 
This lawsuit arises out of a 1991 breach of an agreement between Macris and Images. R. 
8, 208-14, 413. Macris prevailed in the first lawsuit concerning the breach of the agreement by 
receiving a judgment against Images. R. 263, 507 p. 14. Apparently, that judgment was not 
enough. Macris filed a second lawsuit against Images' privy, Neways, in an effort to extend the 
first lawsuit's damages award. R. 1-12. However, the doctrine of res judicata bars the claims in 
the second lawsuit as a matter of law. 
Macris used the theories of fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor liability to 
support two separate damages claims. First, Macris claimed that these theories allowed Macris to 
claim damages in excess of those already awarded in the first lawsuit. These damages had already 
been claimed and denied in the previous action. Second, Macris claimed that Neways should be 
liable for those damages already awarded to Macris in the first lawsuit, notwithstanding the fact 
5 
that Neways was not a party to the previous action. The doctrine of res judicata bars both types of 
claims. 
Res judicata "bars the litigation of a claim that previously has been fully litigated between 
the same parties." Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The reason for which res judicata bars a second claim is: 
[h]aving been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts 
another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a 
different substantive law premise or ground. This does not constitute the 
presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the 
same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the second action 
should be held barred. 
Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see Schaer v. Utah Dept. OfTransp., 
657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 cmt. d (1982). 
Res judicata bars a second action if: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must 
be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment of the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, Inc., 
913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995); Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340; Bruno, 735 P.2d at 389. This doctrine 
is "based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties 
to one fair trial of an issue or cause." State In the Interest of J.J.T.^ 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). Further, the doctrine has evolved to protect the public interest by "fostering reliance 
on the prior adjudication, preventing inconsistent judgments, relieving parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, and conserving judicial resources." Id. (quotations omitted). 
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In the first action, Macris had a full and fair opportunity to argue and receive all of his 
future damages resulting from a 1991 breach of an agreement between Macris and Images. R. 
279. The trial court awarded Macris $487,638.87 plus interest based on his arguments. R. 263, 
507 p. 14. However, Macris is now trying to recover more damages from the 1991 breach of the 
agreement by suing Images' privy for different legal theories: fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and 
successor liability. R. 1-12. Res judicata bars each of these claims. 
A. Neways is Images9 Privy. 
Due to the September sale and transfer of assets, Neways is Images' privy. Even Macris 
admits that Neways is Images' privy for purposes of successor liability. (Brief of Appellee at pp. 
41-46). However, Macris contradicts himself by arguing that Neways is not Images' privy for 
purposes of res judicata. (Brief of Appellant at p. 32). Despite Macris' contradictory contentions, 
Neways is Images' privy. 
First, contrary to Macris' assertion, Utah courts have clearly defined privity. The Utah 
Supreme Court defined privity as : 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another is a person so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes a 
mutual or successive relationship to rights in property. 
Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978); see B.J.H. v. State of Utah, 945 P.2d 158, 
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982). Therefore, a party 
can be a privy of another and not be the successor corporation, but a successor is necessarily a 
privy. See id. 
1 
Images sold and transferred some of its assets to Neways for valuable consideration. R. 
I 
227, 323, 351. With respect to those transferred assets, Neways was identified in interest with 
Images. Macris must admit that Neways was Images' privy in order to be successful on his 
successor liability argument against Neways. R. 1-12, 286-93. (Brief of Appellee at pp. 41-46). 
To be Images' successor, Neways would, by definition, be Images' privy. 
In addition, Macris had a full and fair opportunity to argue its claims against Neways in 
the first lawsuit. R. 263, 507 p. 14. Macris was the beneficiary of almost a half-million dollar 
judgment because of his full and fair opportunity to argue his case. R. 263, 507 p. 14. Macris 
now wants to increase the damages allotted to him by bringing the current lawsuit to argue 
substantially the same facts and evidence pertaining to the 1991 breach. Macris has already had 
his day in court. 
However, if the Court believes that Macris did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
argue his claim for damages, it was only Macris' failure to plead the causes of action in the first 
lawsuit. Almost a year after the transfer of assets to Neways, Macris filed the last pleading in the 
first lawsuit, even after Macris had full knowledge of the creation of Neways and the transfer of 
assets. R. 1-12, 507 p. 15. If Macris did not have his day in court, it was due to his failure to 
plead causes of action that related to the same transaction that were existing at the time Macris 
filed the last pleading. 
Neways is Images' privy because the two companies represent the same legal right with 
respect to the assets that were transferred, and Macris had an opportunity to argue his claims at 
trial. Consequently, the first prong of the Madsen test is satisfied. 
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B. Macris Could and Should Have Brought the Fraudulent Transfer, Alter Ego, 
and Successor Liability Claims against Images9 Privy in the First Lawsuit 
For res judicata to bar a claim, the second element a party must demonstrate is that "the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that 
could and should have been raised in the first action." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988); Schaer v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983); State in the 
Interest of J J. T, 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. 
Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Before a court can decide if a party "could have 
and should have" included a claim, a party "must first overcome the threshold determination of 
whether the claims, demands or causes of action of both cases are the same." Schaer, 657 P.2d at 
1340 n.2; Searle} 588 P.2d at 690; Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 
1978); Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The courts are expanding the definition of a claim or cause of action for res judicata 
preclusion. See Manego v. Orleans Board of Trade, 598 F.Supp. 231, 234 (D. Mass 1984). 
There are various tests used throughout the courts to determine if a second claim or cause of 
action is identical to a previous claim. These various tests are the "Same Facts and Witnesses," 
"Entire Controversy," "Same Transaction," and "Primary Right Tests." No matter which test this 
Court uses, Macris' first and second lawsuits will be classified as the same claim. 
1. Under Utah's Same Facts and Witnesses Test, the fraudulent transfer, alter 
ego and successor liability claims against Neways are the same claim as the 
breach of contract claim against Images in the first lawsuit 
In Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
Same Facts and Witnesses Test in determining if a second claim is the same as the first for the 
9 
purpose of preclusion. In Schaer, the first action was a condemnation proceeding in which the 
plaintiff received more than $100,000 because plaintiffs property was landlocked. In another 
lawsuit against a different litigant, the state claimed that a road into the plaintiffs property was a 
thoroughfare and residents could use it. With this new information, plaintiff, in its second lawsuit 
that was filed thirteen years after the first lawsuit, argued that his property was worth more 
money because of the thoroughfare. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the claims are different if "[t]he two causes of action 
rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to 
sustain the two causes of action." Id. at 1340. Because the claims arose thirteen years apart, the 
facts and evidence necessary to prove a condemnation and thoroughfare proceedings are 
different, and the issue of thoroughfare was not litigated in the first action, the claims are 
different and res judicata is not a bar to the second action. Id. at 1342. 
In the present case, the facts and witnesses used to support the damages claim of Macris' 
first and second lawsuits are identical. The damages for both claims arise from the 1991 breach 
of the agreement between the parties. R. 8-10, 228-9, 431-32, 507 p. 12. Macris used these facts, 
evidence, and witnesses in the first action to recover almost a half-million dollars in damages. 
R. 263, 507 p. 14. The court did not extend damages past August of 1992. R. 263, 507 p. 14. 
Therefore, unlike Schaer, the damages issue has been adequately litigated in the first action and 
there has been an adjudication on those arguments. The same facts and evidence test bars Macris9 
second claim for damages. 
However, Macris tries to make the claims in the first and second lawsuits different by 
claiming a couple of different facts that would be needed to prove the second action, but would 
10 
be irrelevant to the first. R. 1-12. By so doing, Macris tries to "dress up" the old claim used to 
recover damages to increase the damages award. R. 1-12. Res judicata bars this deceptive 
practice. See Armstrong v. Norwest Bank, Minneapolis, 964 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1992) (res 
judicata "prevents parties from suing on a claim that is in essence the same as a previously 
litigated claim but is dressed up to look different."). Thus, where Macris has fashioned a new 
theory of recovery or cites a new body of law that was arguably violated by Images' privy, 
Neways, res judicata still bars the second claim if it is based on the same facts and evidence as 
the first. See Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1987). Macris' damages in the 
second lawsuit is clearly based on action that took place in the first lawsuit. R. 1-12, 263, 507 p. 
14. The facts of the two lawsuits are so intricately intertwined that if Macris had been 
unsuccessful in his first action, he would have no claims in the second. Macris' second lawsuit is, 
therefore, barred by res judicata pursuant to Utah's Same Facts and Evidence Test. 
2. Macris' second lawsuit is barred under the Entire Controversy Test. 
Another test used in determining if res judicata bars later claims is the "Entire 
Controversy Test." "The entire controversy doctrine requires that a person assert in one action 
all related claims against a particular adversary or be precluded from bringing a second action 
based on the omitted claims against that party." O'Shea v. Amoco Oil, Co., 886 F.2d 584, 590 
(3rd Cir. 1989); Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274, 279 (3rd Cir. 1986). This doctrine is 
designed to prevent the "multiplicity of suits and their attendant harassment." O'Shea, 886 F.2d 
at 590. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals case O'Shea v. Amoco Oil Co. is instructive. In 
O 'Shea, plaintiff and defendant entered into a franchise contract wherein plaintiff agreed to 
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operate defendant's franchise 24 hours a day. Plaintiff decided to close the franchise during late 
evening hours due to loss of business during these hours. Defendant sued plaintiff for breach of 
contract and prevailed. However, two months before trial in the first suit, defendant threatened 
plaintiff that plaintiffs agreement would be terminated if he did not operate the franchise 24 
hours a day. 
Soon after the first trial, plaintiff sued defendant under the NJFPA, New Jersey Franchise 
Practices Act. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's threat to terminate the franchise agreement 
unless the franchise remained opened twenty-four hours a day was an unreasonable business 
standard. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the second suit 
was barred because of res judicata. The plaintiff did not plead "all related claims," including 
those that became ripe only two months before trial, in the first action. Id. Therefore, res 
judicata barred the second lawsuit. 
In comparison to the present case, the entire controversy doctrine would bar Macris' 
second lawsuit. Both lawsuits are attempts to receive damages resulting from the 1991 breach of 
the agreement. R. 8-10, 208-14, 228-29, 413, 431-32, 507 p.12. The evidence demonstrates that 
the transfer, which is the basis for which Macris' tries to extend his damages, took place two and 
a half years before trial, and one year before Macris filed his last pleading. R. 227, 507 p. 15. 
Further, Macris spent at least three days reviewing Neways' financial documentation during the 
two and a half year period. R. 227. Macris had ample notice that these claims could have 
extended his damages resulting from the 1991 breach, but Macris failed to allege them at the time 
the last pleading was filed. R. 507 p. 15. Therefore, the entire controversy doctrine prohibits 
Marcis from bringing his second lawsuit against Images' privy, Neways. 
12 
3. The Same Transaction Approach bars Macris from litigating the second 
lawsuit. 
The majority of courts have adopted the Restatement's Same Transaction Approach. 
"Under this approach, a valid and final judgment in the first action will extinguish subsequent 
claims with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions out of 
which the action arose." Porn v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 
1996); see Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1996); Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 
741 (8th Cir. 1990); Manego v. Orleans Bd. Of Trade, 773 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985); Restatement 
(Second) Judgments § 24 (1982). In defining a transaction, a court should analyze "whether the 
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, 
and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations." Porn, 93 F.3d at 34; 
see Aunyx Corp. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 978 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Lane, 899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th 
Cir. 1990). The three elements of this approach favor Neways. 
a. Time, space, origin and motivation of the lawsuit. 
The first factor a court must analyze in determining if the second lawsuit arises from the 
"same transaction" is the time, space, origin, and motivation of the two lawsuits. This element is 
satisfied if the two lawsuits "arise out of the same transaction, seek redress for essentially the 
same basic wrong, and rest on the same or substantially similar factual basis." Porn, 93 F.3d at 
34. Further, a cause of action for contract and one for tort can arise from the same transaction if 
"they both seek redress for essentially the same basic wrong." Id.; see Lane, 899 F.2d at 743 
(holding that the "Restatement (Second)'s 'transactional' approach to res judicata contemplates 
that there may be some variance in the proof required for claims that are nonetheless the 'same 
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claim' for res judicata purposes. The operative question in each case is whether the claims arise 
out of the same nucleus of facts."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. c (1982) 
(clarifying that because two claims depend on different shadings of the facts or emphasize 
different elements of the facts, a court should not color its perception of the transaction 
underlying them, creating multiple transactions when only one exists). 
No matter how Macris classifies this lawsuit, both the first and second lawsuits arise from 
the 1991 breach of the parties' agreement. R. 8-10, 228-29, 431-32, 507 p. 12. The elements 
needed to prove damages in both cases come from the 1991 breach. All proof, witnesses, and 
facts that were necessary for Macris to receive a half million dollar judgment in the first lawsuit 
had to be proven for Macris to receive any damages in the second lawsuit. R. 1-12, 263, 507 p. 
14. The facts of the two cases are so intricately intertwined that Macris had to be successful in 
this first action to have any claim in the second action. Therefore, the two lawsuits should be 
treated as one and the Court should bar the second lawsuit. See Lane, 899 F.2d at 744; 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. c (1982). 
b. Trial convenience of the lawsuit. 
The second element of the Same Transaction Test is trial convenience. "This factor, 
aimed at conserving judicial resources, provides that where the witnesses or proof needed in the 
second action overlap substantially with those used in the first action, the second action should 
ordinarily be precluded." Porn, 93 F.3d at 36; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. 
b (1982). The prong best promotes the public interest of "fostering reliance on prior adjudication, 
preventing inconsistent judgments, relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
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and conserving judicial resources." State in the Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). 
The trial convenience element favors Neways' assertion that Macris should have brought 
all claims in the first lawsuit. Macris has already been given the opportunity to argue his full 
damages resulting from the 1991 breach of the agreement. R. 263, 279, 507 p. 14. Macris' 
second lawsuit is an attempt to extend the first lawsuit's damages into the future, and make 
Images' privy liable for the judgment. R. 1-12. Macris knew of these potential claims to extend 
his damages before the filing of the last pleading in the first lawsuit. R. 227, 273-39, 507 p. 15. If 
Macris would have plead these claims, the same witnesses and evidence would have been 
available. However, because Macris did not plead them, the parties are forced into their seventh 
year of litigation. R. 227-28, 507 p. 8-9. 
c. The parties' expectations. 
The third element of the Same Transaction Test is for the Court to determine what were 
the parties' expectations. Porn, 93 F.3d at 34. In the present case, it is clear that both parties' 
expected or should have expected the second claims to have been encompassed by the first 
lawsuit. For example, after Neways was created and purchased Images' assets, Neways did 
nothing in the first lawsuit. Neways knew that it was in privity with Images because of the sale, 
but Macris did not allege any liability against Neways. Therefore, Neways did not use its staff of 
corporate attorneys to defeat Macris' claims against Images. Neways was lulled into a false 
sense of security, believing that Macris was not looking to Neways for its damages. Neways was 
not given an opportunity to defend itself and is now asked to pay the damages assessed against 
Images, without giving Neways its day in court. 
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On the other hand, it is clear that Macris cannot deny that he had full knowledge of the 
claims against Neways. Images transferred most of its assets to Neways almost a year before 
Macris filed the last leading in the first lawsuit. R. 227, 323, 351, 507 p. 15. After the transfer, 
the trial court vacated the first trial that was eventually held two and a half years later. R. 227. 
During this two and a half year period, the trial court reopened discovery and Macris spent three 
days reviewing Neways' documents. R. 273-79, 507 p. 12, 14, 15. Macris knew before he filed 
the last pleading in the first lawsuit that he had claims against Images' privy that could increase 
his possibility of receiving and increasing his damages. R. 507 p. 12. 
Res judicata bars Macris' second lawsuit pursuant to the Same Transaction Test. The 
time, space, origin, and motivation, trial convenience, and parties' expectations favor Neways. 
4. The Primary Right Test bars Maoris' second lawsuit against Neways. 
Another test used in determining if res judicata bars a second lawsuit is the Primary Right 
Test. 
Under the primary right theory, the underlying right sought to be enforced 
determines the cause of action. In determining the primary right, the significant 
factor is the harm suffered. Only one primary right exists when two actions 
involve the same harm to the plaintiff, even when different legal theories and 
remedies are available for that particular harm. Consequently, numerous cases 
hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit 
is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory . . . or seeks a 
different remedy. 
Production Supply Co., Inc. v. Fry Steel, Inc., 14 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
The case Reed v. Marketing Services, International, LTD, 540 F.Supp. 893 (S.D. Texas 
1982), is illustrative. In Reed, the plaintiff sued defendants for a breach of contract surrounding 
an escrow transaction. The first court awarded judgment for plaintiff. Soon thereafter, plaintiff 
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sued defendant a second time alleging fraud and other causes of action in an effort to increase its 
damages. Further, to support its second lawsuit, Plaintiff alleged that the fraud was not 
ascertainable until after the trial in the first lawsuit. 
The court did not agree with the plaintiff. Following the Primary Right Test, the court 
held that "the thing, therefore, which in contemplation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for 
action, is not the group of facts alleged in the declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of 
these is the legal wrong, the existence of which, if true, they conclusively evince." Reed, 540 
F.Supp at 898. The court held that both the fraud and contract lawsuits were claiming the same 
damages, but the only difference is the legal theory used. See id. Therefore, "one fair day in 
court is enough." Id. 
Reed is similar to the present case. As in Reed, there are two lawsuits, one in contract, the 
other in fraud, that are claiming damages that arise out of a result of a 1991 breach of an 
agreement. R. 1-12. Macris had his fair day in court and received substantial damages. R. 263, 
507 p. 14. Macris would not have damages in the second lawsuit but for the breach in the first. 
Consequently, the second lawsuit shares the same facts and evidence to support the wrong and/or 
damages as the first lawsuit. R. 1-12, 227, 263, 507 p. 14. The only thing different between these 
cases is that Macris uses different legal theories, fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor 
liability, in the second lawsuit to increase his damages from the first. Res judicata bars this 
action because Macris alread} had his full and fair day in court. R. 227. 
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5. No matter what test this Court adopts, res judicata bars Macris' second 
lawsuit because Macris9 first and second lawsuits are the same claims. 
No matter what test this court follows, the result is the same. The first and second 
lawsuits are clearly the same claims seeking damages resulting from the 1991 breach of an 
agreement. R. 8, 208-21, 413. Therefore, Macris' second lawsuit is barred by res judicata. 
C. Whether this Court Holds that Macris had a Duty to Amend, or Did Not 
Have a Duty to Amend, Res Judicata Bars Macris9 Second Lawsuit Because 
the Second Lawsuit Could Have and Should Have Been Included in the First 
Lawsuit. 
Once a court decides that two causes of action are the same claim, then the court must 
decide if the action could have or should have been included in the first action. Courts have held 
that a party has a duty to amend causes of action if they occur before trial, and other courts have 
held that only those actions that are in existence at the time the suit was filed or the party's last 
pleading therein are barred by res judicata. (Brief of Appellee at 27). 
1. Macris had a duty to amend the lawsuit before trial to include similar claims. 
Res judicata supports the public policy of "fostering reliance of prior adjudication, 
preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits 
and conserving judicial resources." State in the Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quotations omitted). These policies are undermined and irrelevant if a party does 
not have a duty to amend to include all claims that the party knew or should have known that 
arise from the same transaction. See Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 
866 (9th Cir. 1995) ( holding that a RICO claim had become ripe before judgment was entered so 
the claim should have been argued at the trial); Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1315 (4th Cir. 
1986) (barring all claims that had arisen after complaint was filed and the dismissal of the 
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action); Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. of Claims 1975) 
(requiring "a litigant to seek to amend a pending suit to add later accruing claims under a single 
contract if he is to avoid dismissal of a later suit on the ground he has split his cause of action."). 
After reviewing the facts of the instant case, an amendment rule is required. The sale and 
transfer of assets took place in early September of 1992. R. 227, 323, 351. After the transfer 
occurred, Images filed a pleading in the first lawsuit. R. 507 p. 15. The first trial was vacated and 
the lawsuit was eventually tried two and a half years later. R. 227. The trial court reopened 
discovery and Macris profited by taking three days to review Neways' financial documentation. 
R. 273-279, 507 pp. 12, 14. Then, Macris filed the last pleading in the case about a year after the 
transfer, after Macris had knowledge of the alleged fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor 
liability causes of action that could increase his damages resulting from the 1991 breach. R. 1-
12, 507 p. 15. In fact, two days before trial in the first action, Macris filed the second lawsuit 
demonstrating that he possessed knowledge of the alleged claims against Neways. R. 1-12. 
Simply, Macris knew or should have known of the second lawsuit's claims and how they arose 
out of the same transaction well before trial. Macris had a duty to amend and include those 
claims. 
Numerous courts have held that a party has a duty to amend its complaint if the party 
discovers additional, similar claims. The Utah Court of Appeals case Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), is instructive. In Josephson, the plaintiff sued 
defendant over a right-of-way and to quiet title; the defendant prevailed. During the lawsuit, 
plaintiff was paying taxes on the property with a promise from defendant, even up until trial, that 
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defendant would reimburse plaintiff if defendant won. After winning, the defendant refused to 
reimburse plaintiff for taxes paid. 
Plaintiff sued defendant for reimbursement of the taxes. The Utah Court of Appeals held 
that the second suit was not barred by res judicata. First, the issue of taxes was not litigated 
because it was not ripe for litigation in the first lawsuit. The wrong did not happen until after the 
first lawsuit because "before trial" defendant continued to promise that it would pay plaintiff for 
the taxes. Id. at 678. The court placed emphasis that "before trial" defendant had continued to 
promise to pay the taxes. Therefore, it stands to reason that the Court of Appeals would have 
required plaintiff to make this claim in the first lawsuit if defendant would have conveyed his 
intentions to not pay the taxes before the trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court Case Badger v. Badger, 254 P. 784 (Utah 1927), does not stand 
for the proposition that Macris claims. (Brief of Appellee 28-29). In Badger, defendant twice 
petitioned the court for modification of a divorce decree. The court denied the second petition 
because there were no new relevant facts that had occurred after the first petition; all of the facts 
claimed in the second petition were existing at the time of the first petition. Since plaintiff knew 
all of the facts, the court did not allow the plaintiff to split its claims. Id. at 787. However, the 
court explicitly held that if new facts had surfaced during the first petition, plaintiff "would have 
been granted leave to amend." Id. Therefore, Utah courts favor amending a complaint to include 
claims that have accrued after the filing of the last pleading and before trial. 
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2. In the alternative, if the Court holds that Maoris did not have a duty to 
amend to include the later claims, res judicata still bars the second lawsuits 
because those claims were existing before the filing of the last pleading. 
Macris spends a majority of his brief arguing that res judicata only bars claims if the party 
was "aware of the causes of action at the time the first suit was commenced or the filing of the 
party's last pleading therein'' (Brief of Appellee p. 27) (emphasis in original). Macris cites 
extensive authority to support this proposition. See e.g., Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 
915 (7th Cir. 1993); Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992); Prime 
Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811,816 (2nd Cir. 1990); Balderman v. United 
States Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 57, 62 (2nd Cir. 1989); Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-
Thomas Joint Venture, 835 F.2d 1329, 1336 (10th Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los 
Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 919 
(1985); Green v. Illinois Dept. ofTransp., 609 F.Supp. 1021, 1026 (N.D. 111. 1985); Bolte v. Aits, 
Inc., 587 P.2d 810, 812-13 (Haw. 1978); Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 
149 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Whitaker v. Bank of Newport, 836 P.2d 695, 699 (Or. 1992) (in 
banc); Ben C. Jones & Co. v. Gammel-Statesman Publishing Co., 99 S.W. 701, 703 (Tex. 1907); 
Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Ctr.Jnc, 587 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App. 1979); Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 24, comment d (1982); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4409 (1981). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure define a pleading as: 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim 
denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-
claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is 
summoned under the provisions to Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third-
party complaint is served. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(a). 
In the instant case, pleadings were filed after the transfer and sale of Images to Neways. 
R. 507 p. 15. The transfer took place on September 1, 1992. R. 227, 323, 351. Images then filed 
an Amended Answer, a pleading, on September 9, 1992. R. 507 p. 15. Almost a year later, 
Macris filed a pleading, an Amended Counterclaim and Answer to Third-Party Complaint. R. 
507 p. 15. Clearly, the causes of action alleged in the second lawsuit arose before the filing of 
the complaint or the last pleading filed therein. 
If this Court follows the Restatement, Macris could and should have brought the causes 
of action alleged in the second lawsuit in the first lawsuit. However, for some reason, Macris did 
not, and that error has now caused the parties to enter into their seventh year of litigation. R. 
227-28, 507 p. 8-9. 
D. THE MADSEN TEST IS SATISFIED. 
Res judicata bars the claims alleged in Macris' second lawsuit. Neways is Images' privy, 
the future damages claims could and should have been litigated in the first action, and there has 
been a final judgment on the merits. Therefore, Macris should be barred from collecting future 
damages against Neways, and Neways should not be liable for Images' judgment against Macris. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT NEWAYS WAS IMAGES' 
SUCCESSOR CORPORATION BECAUSE THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT AS TO IF NEWAYS IS IMAGES' SUCCESSOR. 
Each of Macris' claims is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as described above. 
However, even if res judicata did not bar Macris' claims, the trial court erroneously granted 
summary judgment against Neways, holding that Neways is the successor corporation of Images 
and should be liable for Images' debt to Macris. Summary judgment is only proper if there are 
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no genuine issues of material fact. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1991); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. Further all inferences are considered in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Neways is Images' successor. First, 
Neways explained in the Brief of Appellant that the trial court did not take any evidence as to 
whether the sale of assets included the sale of liabilities. (Brief of Appellant pp. 18-19). This is 
not refuted in Macris' Brief in Opposition. (Brief of Appellee p. 43). However, Macris argues 
that the trial court based its successor liability ruling on an exception to the general successor 
liability rule that if a corporation is a mere continuation of another, then successor liability 
applies. (Brief of Appellee at p. 43-46). 
Despite the trial court's findings, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
Neways is a mere continuation of Images. First, the trial court did not receive any evidence on 
the alleged continuation, but made its ruling solely on the disputed allegations contained in the 
pleadings. R. 1-12, 166-75, 425-28, 431. The trial court held that "Neways consists of 
substantially the same assets, products, officers, and employees as Images . . . . " R. 425. The 
pleadings refute this holding. First, Images and Neways only shared one director, the rest of the 
directors, shareholders, and officers are different; Images and Neways did not share the "same 
facilities, employees, distributorships, and health and beauty care products;" and many of 
Images' distributors would not join Neways, causing many former Images' distributors to not 
retain their same rank and downline in Neways. R. 92,171, 352. Clearly there were disputed 
issues of fact concerning Neways' alleged "mere continuation" of Images in front of the trial 
court to preclude a grant of summary judgment. R. 92, 171, 352, 425. 
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Further, the pleadings show that the parties agreed that Eclat was Images' true successor. 
It is true as Macris states that a party may not raise a factual issue for the first time on appeal. 
See Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983); (Brief of Appellee at p. 44). However, 
the issue as to whether Eclat is the successor is contained within the pleadings in the trial court. 
R. 11, 174. In his Complaint, Macris alleged that Eclat was formerly known as Images, i.e. the 
successor. R. 11. Neways admitted the truth to this allegation. R. 174. Macris did not make an 
effort through discovery to fully comprehend Eclat's successorship. Neways should not be 
punished for Macris' failure to properly conduct discovery. 
There were issues of fact as to whether Neways was Images' successor corporation. First, 
no evidence was received by the trial court as to whether Neways assumed Images' debt to 
Macris. Second, every fact that supported the trial court's holding that Neways was a mere 
continuation of Images was disputed in the pleadings or by affidavit. Finally, the parties, through 
the pleadings, had agreed that Eclat was the successor corporation. The trial court erred in 
granting Macris' summary judgment holding that Neways is Images' successor. 
CONCLUSION 
Res judicata bars Macris' fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor liability claims. 
There is privity between Neways and Images, Macris could have and should have brought each 
of these claims in the first action because both lawsuits seek recovery on the same claim for 
damages and they were in existence before the filing of the last pleadings in the first lawsuit, and 
there was an undisputed final judgment on the merits of the first action. Therefore, Neways 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision and hold that the doctrine of 
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res judicata bars Macris' successor liability claim, and affirm the trial court's holding that res 
judicata bars Macris' attempt for future damages. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that res judicata does not bar the successor liability 
claim, then Neways respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand the successor 
liability claim to the trial court to allow the parties an opportunity to present evidence regarding 
the true successor to Images. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1998. 
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ADDENDUM 
Allen K. Young #A3583 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone (801) 489-3294 
R. Bret Jenkins #5094 
Richard Halliday #4588 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
660 South 200 East, Suite #301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-6200 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURl 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., : AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
: AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
: Civil No. 910400358 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a : Judge: Chris-censen 
Utah corporation, and : 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, : 
Defendants, : 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., : 
vs. : 
FILE COPY 
1 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-Party Defendant 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Images and Attitude, Inc •, and 
alleges as Counter Claim against the Plaintiff and Third Party 
Complaint against Third Party Defendant, Mike Maoris, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(ALTER-EGO) 
1. Third Party Defendant is an individual residing in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That on or about the 7th day of August, 1989, Plaintiff 
and Defendant entered into a Distributorship agreement. A few 
months later the addendum referred to in the Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint was incorporated therein. 
3. That said agreement adopts by reference the Policies and 
Procedures of Images. A true and correct copy of the said Policies 
and Procedures is attached hereto and marked "Exhibit A." 
4. The Third Party Defendant, Mike Macris, had continued and 
does continue to operate the corporation, Macris & Associates, as 
his alter-ego, and the said corporation has no separate identity or 
existence apart from the Third Party Defendant. 
2 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DEFAMATION) 
15. Defendants incorporate the allegations of the First and 
Second Cause of Action as though set forth fully herein. 
16. That such conduct on the part of the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant constitutes slanderous conduct. 
17. That the defamatory comments have been published to many 
people, many of which are distributors of the Defendant company. 
18. That said comments were made with full knowledge of the 
untruth of said comments. 
19. That said comments were made willfully, maliciously and 
wantonly and with total disregard for the rights of the Defendants. 
20. By reason of the forgoing the Defendants have been 
damaged in amounts which are yet unknown but which should be 
determined at trial, but which in no event should be less than 
$1,000,000.00. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS) 
21. The Defendants reallege the allegations set forth in the 
First, Second, and Third Cause of Action as though set forth fully 
herein. 
22. Upon information and belief the Defendant alleges that 
the conduct complained of hereinabove was done intentionally and 
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maliciously and with the intent to deceive and to make defamatory 
statements in order to gain unfair and unlawful advantage over the 
Defendant in the marketplace. 
23. The Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant ]mew; or should 
have known, of the importance to the Defendants of the independent 
contractual relations and business related good will between the 
Defendant and its distributors. 
24. That the actions of the Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant were part of an extensive, systematic and intentional 
plan to discredit, injure and defame the Defendants and to gain 
distributors to work for the Plaintiff1 s and Third Party 
Defendant's new company. 
25. In so doing, the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant have 
maliciously and intentionally attempted to induce independent 
distributors of the Defendant to breach their contractual relations 
with the Defendants. 
26. That such conduct as set forth hereinabove was in direct 
violation of the Policies and Procedures Agreement. 
27. That by reason of the foregoing, the Defendant has 
suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 
28. Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, the 
Defendant will continue to suffer such harm. 
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29. Defendant has no adequate remedy of law because the full 
extent of his damages are difficult to prove vith reasonable 
certainty and cannot, in any event, adequately compensate the 
Defendants for the loss of good will and distributors and its 
company. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS) 
30. The Defendants reallege the allegations set forth in the 
First, Second, Third and Fourth Cause of Action as though set forth 
fully herein. 
31. By engaging in the actions outlined above, the Plaintiff 
and Third Party Defendants have interfered with the Defendant's 
prospective economic relations with its independent contractors, 
with potential independent contractors, with customers and with 
potential customers. 
32. The means that the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant 
are using and have used to interfere with the Defendants 
prospective economic relations are improper in that they amount to 
deceit, misrepresentation, defamations and because they violate the 
established standard in the business and the Images Policies and 
Procedures. 
33. The Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant 's actions were 
taken in bad faith in that they were willful and intentional. 
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34. The actions of Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant have 
injured Defendant by damaging its reputation and by causing it to 
lose independent contractors, prospective independent contractors, 
customers and prospective customers, thereby causing the Defendant 
damages in amounts to be proven at trial as well as other 
substantial an irreparable harm. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT) 
35. Defendant incorporates the allegations of the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Cause of Action as though set forth 
fully herein. 
36. Prior to entering into the auto-qualification agreement 
which is the subject of this litigation, Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant represented he had a grant and had developed with Dr. 
Donald Lyman of the University of Utah a gel and nail preparation 
for a fingernail bonding system. 
37. Defendants had experienced difficulties with a prior 
system containing Methylacrylic Acid, a skin irritant, and 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant further represented that said 
products did not contain Methylacrylic KoiA.^fi^&jfl^'^ 
38. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant further/represented 
that they possessed and would provide Material Safety Data Sheets 
confirming that said products did not contain Methylacrylic Acid. 
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39. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant further represented 
that said products were produced exclusively by them and not 
available from any other source. 
40. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant further represented 
that they had $250,000.00 of advertising already in place to 
promote said product. 
41. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant further represented 
that they intended to develop their own distributorship in 
accordance with the requirements of Defendant Images for 
qualification at the Presidential level. 
42. All of the foregoing representations of Plaintiff and 
Third Party Defendant were false. 
43. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant altered or caused to 
be altered Material Safety Data Sheets to exclude the information 
showing that their products contained dangerous quantities of 
Methylacrylic Acid. 
44. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant contracted with the 
third parties to develop other distributorships to the exclusion 
and detriment of their own. 
45. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant knew at the time that 
said representation were false, material to the agreement between 
the parties, and made for the purpose of inducing Defendants into 
executing said agreement. 
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46. Defendants reasonably relied on said fraudulent 
misrepresentations and entered into the agreement auto-qualifying 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant at the Presidential level based 
thereon. 
47. Defendants have been damaged by said misrepresentations 
in that they have paid monies to Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant based thereon, have purchased large and unnecessary 
quantities of said nail care systems and its accompanying 
equipment, have been sued by various parties damaged by the 
Methylacrylic Acid in said products, lost productive Distributors 
and suffered extensive damage to their goodwill and reputation as 
a result thereof. 
48. Defendants are entitled to a judgment of the Court, 
rescinding the subject contract between the parties and awarding 
Defendants compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial 
and including all monies previously paid to Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant, the cost of all said nail care systems and 
equipment unnecessarily purchased, all costs and amounts related to 
suit filed against Defendants related to said systems including the 
suit involving Affinity, Inc., and all damages related to the loss 
of Distributors, goodwill and reputation. Defendants are further 
entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial 
plus costs of Court and attorney^ fees. 
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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(PUNITIVE DAMAGES) 
49. Defendant incorporates the allegations of the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Cause of Action as though 
fully set forth herein. 
50. By reason of the willful, wanton and malicious conduct of 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant set forth hereinabove, the 
Defendant is entitled to punitive or exemplary damages in the sum 
of one million dollars. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant pray for judgment as follows: 
1. For an injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant from: 
(a) Using false or misleading statements or statements 
that have a tendency to deceive when contacting or advertising 
their other products or commercial activities to the public and to 
independent contractors of Images. 
(b) Making false or misleading statements concerning 
Defendant Images and Thomas Mower. 
2. For judgment in such amounts as shall be proven at trial 
but which should in no event shall be less that $1,000,000.00. 
3. For rescission of the auto-qualification agreement and an 
award of all damages to Defendants related thereto. 
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4. For punitive or exemplary damages in the sum of 
$1,000,000.00. 
5. For reasonable attorney's fees and Court costs incurred 
herein. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and proper in the premises. 
DATED this & day of ^ X ^ . . 1992. 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
By:
 x_, 
Bfichard L."Hall Lday-
'Attorney for Defendants 
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A.rs '0 •£'65 
Jon V. Harper (#1378) 
1059 First Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
(801) 581-4032 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
(801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Maoris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party 
Defendant Mike Maoris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE MACRIS, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.'S 
REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
AND MIKE MACRIS'S ANSWER TO 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 910400358 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris hereby reply to the 
Amended Counterclaim and answer the Third-Party Complaint as 
follows: 
1. Admit the averments contained in paragraph 1 of the 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (hereinafter 
"Amended Counterclaim"). 
2. Admit the averments contained in paragraph 2 of the 
Amended Counterclaim, except deny that the addendum referred to in 
Plaintiff's Amended Counterclaim was incorporated Na few months 
later.H 
3. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 3 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
4. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 4 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
5. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 5 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
6. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 6 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
7. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 7 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
8. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 8 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
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9. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 9 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
10. As an answer and reply to paragraph 10 to the Amended 
Counterclaim, Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris repeat and 
incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, admission 
and denial set forth in paragraphs 1 through 9 above and deny each 
and every other averment contained in paragraph 10 of the Amended 
Counterclaim • 
11. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 11 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
12. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 12 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
13. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 13 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
14. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 14 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
15. As an answer and reply to paragraph 15 of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris repeat and 
incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, admission 
and denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 14 above. 
16. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 16 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
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17. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 17 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
18. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 18 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
19. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 19 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
20. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 20 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
21. As an answer and reply to paragraph 21 of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Maoris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris hereby 
repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission and denial set forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 above. 
22. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 22 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
23. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 23 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
24. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 24 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
25. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 25 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
26. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 26 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
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27. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 27 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
28. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 28 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
29. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 29 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
30. As an answer and reply to paragraph 30 of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris repeat and 
incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, admission 
and denial set forth in paragraphs 1 through 29 above. 
31. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 31 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
32. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 32 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
33. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 33 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
34. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 34 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
35. As an answer and reply to paragraph 35 of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris repeat and 
incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, admission 
and denial set forth in paragraphs 1 through 34 above. 
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36. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 36 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
37 • Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 37 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
38. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 38 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
39. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 39 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
40. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 40 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
41. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 41 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
42 • Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 42 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
43. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 43 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
44. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 44 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
45. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 45 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
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46. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 46 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
47. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 47 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
48. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 48 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
49. As an answer and reply to paragraph 49 of the Amended 
Counterclaim, Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Macris repeat and 
incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, admission 
and denial set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48 above. 
50. Deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 50 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
51. Defendant's Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
52 • Defendant has failed to plead fraud with particularity as 
required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, 
therefore, is precluded from obtaining any relief on its claim for 
fraud• 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
53. The Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint must 
be dismissed for failure to join indispensable parties. 
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
54. Defendant may not recover on any of the claims for relief 
contained in its Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on 
the grounds of estoppel, waiver and ratification. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
55. Defendant may not recover on any of the claims for relief 
contained in its Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint by 
reason of Defendant's breach of the contract with Macris & 
Associates, Inc. and by reason for failure of consideration. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
56. Defendant is precluded from recovering on any of the 
claims for relief contained in its Amended Counterclaim and Third-
Party Complaint by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
57. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant are entitled to 
recover their attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-27^56. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
58. Defendant has not suffered any special harm or specific 
damage as a result of the allegedly slanderous statements or 
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injurious falsehoods set forth in the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
59. The allegedly slanderous statements and injurious 
falsehoods set forth in the Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint are true, at least in substance, which is a complete 
defense to the defamation and injurious falsehood actions. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
60. Even if plaintiff and third-party defendant made the 
allegedly defamatory statements as alleged in the Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and the statements were not 
true, the alleged statements concerned a public figure and were 
made without malice, and plaintiff and third-party defendant had a 
constitutionally protected privilege to make the alleged 
statements• 
*T-*VENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
61. Even if plaintiff and third-party defendant made the 
allegedly defamatory statements or injurious falsehoods as alleged 
in the Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and the 
statements were not true, any such statements were made for the 
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protection of thsir own respective interests, the interests of 
third persons or certain interests of the public, and plaintiff and 
third-party defendant therefore had a qualified privilege to make 
the alleged statements. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
62. Third-party defendant is not a party to the agreement 
which defendant alleges in its Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint has been breached and therefore cannot be liable for 
breach of that contract. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
63. Defendant'8 claims raised in the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
64. Any allegedly defamatory statement or injurious falsehood 
in defendant's claims were simply statements of opinion and are not 
actionable. 
WHEREFORE Macris & Associates, Inc. and Mike Maoris pray for 
relief as follows) 
A. The Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice and that Defendant takes nothing by its 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint; 
B. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant be awarded their 
costs of suit incurred herein including reasonable attorneys' fees; 
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C. For such and other relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED: August 23 j 1993. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Kairrenberc 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Maoris & 
Associates, Inc. and Third-Party 
Defendant Mike Maoris 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this A\JAil day of August, 1993, I hereby caused to be 
mailed via U.S. first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Maoris & Associates, Inc.'s Answer to 
Amended Counterclaim and Mike Macris's Answer to Third-Party 
Complaint to the following: 
Shawn Turner, Esq. 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
660 South 200 East, Suite #301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
YOUNG & KESTER 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-party Plaintiff 
Jon V. Harper, Esq. 
1059 First Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
£ w / J % » 
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